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Abstract This article concerns a relatively novel issue: rule breaking and unlawful conduct
by government bodies; to which degree does it occur, what is the nature of this misconduct,
what are the underlying motives, and what are the consequences and possible solutions?
Rule and law breaking is harmful for the credibility and integrity of a state and its law
enforcement system. However, very little empirical research has been carried out into this
issue, in comparison to research into state crime. There is little clarity about how public
actors deal with criminal and administrative laws and rules in areas like environmental
protection, safety regulations and working conditions. Do government bodies set a good
example? Is their behaviour better or worse than the public and businesses? An analytical
framework for research will be presented and also the results of an extensive research
project in the Netherlands; the main themes of which have been benchmarked against data
from the United Kingdom. The article will conclude with a summary of the main findings
and a number of suggestions for further research and policy development.
Introduction
Governmental bodies are expected to act in the interest of the public, to make rules and laws to
enhance the public interest and to ensure that society observes these rules. We therefore expect
that government bodies set a good example and abide by ‘their own’ laws and regulations.
Crime Law Soc Change (2006) 46:133–159
DOI 10.1007/s10611-006-9050-4
L. W. J. C. Huberts (*)
Public Administration and Organization Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081,
Amsterdam 1081 HV, The Netherlands
e-mail: lwjc.huberts@fsw.vu.nl
A. J. G. M. van Montfort
Public Administration and Organization Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
A. Doig
Public Services Management and Head of the Fraud Management Studies Unit at Teesside Business
School, University of Teesside, Middlesbrough, UK
D. Clark
Criminology Group, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK
However, this is surely not always the case, as is evident from the fact that there are astonishing
examples of government bodies and officials who break rules and laws. Crimes which fall
under the category ‘state crimes,’ i.e. extraordinary cases of deliberate governmental
misconduct or negligence, are high profile cases and receive significant attention. On the other
hand, the less extraordinary routine rule breaking conduct that occurs on a regular basis and has
consequences for many citizens is seldom highlighted. Governmental bodies draw up,
implement and enforce laws and rules on a daily basis and across a broad spectrum of functions
and public services. Breaking these regulations or the failure to implement them has more or
less serious implications for a lot of citizens, which sometimes results in a disastrous event.
In the past years several huge fire disasters have occurred in the Netherlands. The Dutch
government bodies were held accountable to a great extent, due to their reluctance to
implement and enforce rules and laws. In May 2000, a fireworks factory, which was located
centrally in the city of Enschede, exploded resulting in twenty deaths and approximately
one hundred casualties [71]. Slightly more than 6 months later, on New Year’s Eve 2001, a
bar went up in flames in the Dutch town of Volendam. Fourteen youngsters lost their lives
in the fire and approximately 200 more were injured [58]. The most recent case, in October
2005, was a fire at a prison complex at Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport, in which 11 asylum
seekers, awaiting deportation, were killed. The definitive report from The Dutch Safety
Board stated that if all safety regulations had been met, there would have certainly been
fewer deaths maybe even no deaths at all. A group of governmental bodies has been held
liable because of their negligence [66].
In the United Kingdom, Barrow-in-Furness council was charged in August 2002 with seven
counts of corporate manslaughter following the death of one man and hospitalisation of 15
others as a result of an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease in a leisure centre run by the council.
Barrow-in-Furness council was the first public body to be charged with the offence in Britain
[7]. In September 2005, Network Rail Ltd., the government-backed owner of Britain’s
railways, was convicted of violating the UK’s Health and Safety at Work Act. More than 100
people were injured and four died when an express train from London to Leeds derailed after
hitting a cracked rail while travelling 115 miles (185 km)/h in October 2000 [74].
These kinds of incidents stimulate the discussions within society about the phenomenon
of rule and law breaking by government bodies and its sometimes serious consequences.
The subject is also discussed, albeit on a modest scale, by academic researchers. Law
scholars debate whether government bodies should be subject to the penal code in the same
way as private organisations or whether certain categories of governmental actions should
not be prosecutable. Matters concerning the criminal liability of public bodies in relation to
rule breaking conduct are dealt with differently in the various Western countries. This
ranges from no liability at all to a liability for certain categories of decisions, the actions in
specific types of policy sectors or the actions of non-central government bodies [59].
Within political science, public administration, sociology and even criminology [45, 47,
49], very few scholars are actively involved in researching rule and law breaking by
governmental bodies. The majority of the work carried out by these researchers is into ‘state
crime’[28, 41, 42, 61, 62, 63], ‘administrative evil’[1], specific types of crime by politicians
and civil servants for example corruption [6, 32], or ‘dirty hands’ in politics [30, 64]. Rule
and law breaking by governments in a wider sense is a very low profile topic. This is,
however, different for parts of the white collar and organisational crime literature.
Friedrichs [25] for example, focuses on governmental crime and the subject also recurs
in the margins of investigations into organisational crime (i.e. crimes committed by
respected lawful organisations [36]).
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The void in literature relates to less major or ‘day-to-day,’ or even routine violations of
rules and general standards by public bodies. Most researchers are more interested in the
cases that attract a lot of attention such as large-scale corruption, political murder, illegal
arms trading, torture in prisons, etc, which is understandable, given the gravity of these
cases. However, this also hinders the accumulation of knowledge relating to the frequency
and nature of rule and law breaking by government bodies. There is little or no
contemporary empirical research available relating to rule breaking in a more general sense.
For example, there is no data concerning the frequency of rule breaking by governmental
organisations in safety and environmental law areas. We are also in the dark about the level
of compliance within government bodies with respect to laws and regulations in
comparison to members of the public and businesses. Research on these topics is
exceptional (Exceptions are for example: [43, 65]). We simply do not know how often
(western democratic) states break the laws and rules they make.
This knowledge void is troublesome in relation to theories about political and
administrative rule breaking, and it is also troublesome for the body of knowledge on
political and administrative ethics and integrity. Integrity has been defined as being
consistent and coherent in principles, values and action [48], as following regime values
and rules [60] and as acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms and rules [21].
All definitions and interpretations of the integrity of government include following the rules
and the laws government makes for others. This also illustrates the practical importance of
the phenomenon. Rule and law breaking is potentially very damaging for the integrity and
credibility of the state in general and the quality of the law and rule enforcement by the
state in particular.
In order to make a substantial contribution to the development of knowledge concerning
rule breaking by government bodies, a large-scale investigation into governmental rule
breaking was executed in the Netherlands [35]. In addition, in order to achieve a limited
comparative validity of the research findings, the theoretical framework and the main
research findings about the Dutch situation were benchmarked against the United Kingdom
context [17]. In both contexts government bodies are functioning within a developed liberal
democracy. Government bodies are expected to work in the public interest, are governed by
the rule of law, are subject to various legal and normative requirements to work in an
impartial and effective manner, and carry out activities that are scrutinised by regulatory
and other agencies.
The central research question was: To what extent and in which manner do government
bodies break rules, what are the underlying reasons for doing so, which circumstances are
conductive or unfavourable for rule breaking conduct and which measures are
implemented by government bodies in order to prevent rule breaking?
In this article we will present the most important research findings (For a more
comprehensive publication of the research findings see [34]). An outline will be given of
the analytical framework of the research project (“Analytical framework”). The research
methods and their application in a number of subprojects will subsequently be outlined
(“Research data sets and research methods”). This paper will then cover the scope and
character of the phenomenon of law breaking government bodies (“Scope and nature of the
phenomenon”), the conditions for rule breaking (“Conditions for rule breaking”) and the
preventative measures that government bodies have developed so far (“Preventative
measures by government bodies”). Our aim is to validate the relevance of the themes and
issues identified from The Netherlands context by benchmarking them against the
experiences in the United Kingdom (“Benchmarking against the UK”). The article will
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be concluded with conclusions concerning our central research question and a number of
formulated recommendations for tackling the problem of rule breaking government
authorities (“Conclusions and recommendations”).
Analytical framework
The limited extent of specific theories and hypotheses is in fact self-evident, given the
restricted existing knowledge concerning the scale and nature of ‘everyday’ or ‘ordinary’
rule breaking by government bodies. The objective of this explorative research was to ‘fill
up’ the knowledge voids and in doing so, constructing building blocks for the development
of a theory on routine rule breaking. Literature in the fields of political science, public
administration, organisational sociology, criminology, state crime and public integrity
provide a number of concepts that might be constructive for a study into rule breaking by
government bodies. At the very beginning of our investigation a number of these key
concepts were explicitly stated, which together form the conceptual and theoretical
framework upon which the research project is based.
What is rule breaking?
The focus is on the failure to implement, apply fairly or monitor those laws and rules that
govern, or affect the lives and activities of ordinary members of the public. The scope of this
study therefore ranges from environmental issues, to the responsibility of the state to
safeguard the young and the initiatives of government bodies to promote safety and health.
This does not solely relate to those government bodies whose duties relate to the
implementation of the law and the rules but it also relates to those mandated with monitoring
and inspecting the former. Rule breaking may be deliberate or it may be by default. It may be
an individual activity or be something the body decides to either do or not.
Who breaks the rules?
The focus during this research was on governmental bodies, their members and/or
employees. The concept of government bodies pertains to all decision-making institutions
in public life, from the national government to local bodies, whose members or staff are
elected or appointed as public officer-holders, whose budgets are funded largely by public
revenue and audited by public bodies, and whose activities have to be accounted for to the
legislature or other public bodies.
Scale and nature of the issue
There is little information available about the scale of governmental rule breaking. What is
the frequency of rule violations? The aim of this research project was to obtain more
clarification with respect to this matter.
Several aspects were taken into account with regard to the nature of the issue. The focus
in this project was on the gravity of the rule violation (although designating a level of
gravity is easier said than done). We expected that the majority of violations would relate to
minor violations. In this context, criminologist Van den Heuvel [68] refers to these as
ordinary mistakes, and in his opinion, the majority of these are non-culpable, not serious
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and can be rectified. However, in order to obtain an accurate impression of the scale of the
problem of rule breaking government bodies, it was important that these ‘commonplace’
violations were included in the investigation.
Another important aspect of the nature of the violation pertains to the pervasiveness of
rule breaking, which relates to the extent to which violations constitute a common
phenomenon within the public sector. It is conceivable that rule breaking conduct is
established within specific policy fields in particular. However, rule breaking conduct
throughout the entire public sector is also possible.
Furthermore, a distinction can be made regarding the rule breaker’s responsibility, intent
and intention. Firstly, there is a difference between acts of omission and acts of commission.
This dimension was developed by state crime scholars. This concerns whether the state has
failed to act in situations where intervention was required, or has carried out illegal actions
[42]. Supposedly, the distinction does not solely apply to state crimes; it is also applicable
to more ‘ordinary’ violations, e.g. environmental law or security regulation violations.
Secondly, an additional distinction can be made between conscious and unconscious rule
breaking. In cases of unconscious rule breaking the consequences of the rule breaking are
not deliberated due to ignorance or inaccuracy.
A further distinction can be made with respect to conscious rule breaking, which relates
to the rationality of the violation. With regard to decision making conduct, there is an
implicit assumption that this takes place rationally. Rational rule breaking entails that the
consequences of adherence or non-adherence have been weighed up. Consider for example
of rule breaking which creates a practical solution in situations where optimal legal
solutions seem non-viable [22]. The interests and objectives concerned may be personal or
organisational. Organisational crimes and collusion constitute two categories of violations
in which organisational interests are at stake. A rule violation can be denoted as
organisational crime if a corporate body commits the conduct in the interest of the
organisation [22, 67]. This conduct is referred to as collusion when government officials
cooperate with external criminal actors or facilitate their operations [68].
We expected that the lion’s share of conscious rule breaking behaviour would be of a
rational nature. In other cases a violation might be put down, for example, ‘custom and
practice,’ i.e. organisations doing what they do because of tradition, or the inclination of
employees to obey their executives and administrators without question.
This leads us to the last dimension of rule breaking behaviour. This concerns the
awareness and involvement of superiors with respect to violations committed by one or
more subordinates (and vice versa). What is the level of awareness of competent
administrators and senior managers regarding rule violations committed by civil servants?
What do they actually do with the prospective information about rule breaking by
subordinates? What is the level of their involvement in the violations?
Conditions for rule breaking
The important conditions (circumstances) for rule breaking are elaborated on using
investigations concerning governmental integrity (See e.g., [24, 29, 37, 69]), administrative
decision making (See e.g., [38, 39, 46, 70]) and rule breaking in organisations (See e.g.,
[22, 36, 56]). Literature of this type provides examples of many influential conditions, at
micro-level (individual characteristics), meso-level (organisation features) and macro-level
(context and environment). A framework for the research was developed using the
literature. The framework comprises the following components.
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Individual characteristics Some people are more inclined to break rules than others. This
relates to personal morals and personal character. Punch also makes a distinction between
‘risk takers and gamblers’ and ‘trick and treaters;’ types of personalities that are relatively
readily inclined to exhibit rule breaking conduct [57]. According to Jones the personality of
a public servant and the organisational culture determinate to a large degree the motivation
of the person in question to commit rule violations [37].
On the other hand, opportunity is often the key to the activation of rule breaking in such
personalities. In a survey of those who have committed fraud in both public and private
sectors in the US the following was noted: ‘Situation plays a central role in explaining
participation in crime for most offenders in the sample. The lives of those we have termed
opportunity takers and crisis responders do not seem to be characterized by instability and
deviance, and there was little in their records that indicated a predisposition to criminality.
A specific crisis or special opportunity appears to have drawn otherwise conventional
people across the line to crime. Even for those described as opportunity seekers, situational
opportunities play an important role in defining why offenders commit crimes at specific
junctures’ ( [72], pp. 145–146).
Work situation Just as with individuals, there are also certain work situations that are more
sensitive to rule breaking than others. The assumption is made that the probability of
breaking rules increases with the work pressure [46]. It is also assumed that there is a clear
link between the extent of policy discretion and the extent of rule breaking [46]. Other
factors that possibly play a role in this context are the type of decision to be made ([70], pp.
262–264) and the decision-making time [46]. The level of computerisation in the work is
also a relevant aspect. On occasion it is argued that employees are not given much elbow
room to break rules in a highly computerised system ([70], p. 265). However, the contrary
has also been presented [37]. One last relevant factor appears to be the extent to which the
working situation of employees provides opportunities for self-development. Research has
shown that organisations in which the employees are unsatisfied with or alienated from
their work are more predisposed to exhibit rule breaking conduct [22].
Type of tasks There are tasks which seem impossible without cutting corners or bending the
rules ([56], p. 208). Moreover, financially related tasks seem more susceptible to rule
breaking conduct. In this context, reference can be made to the large sums of money
involved in a number of tender procedures and the resulting contracts with private
companies [11], p. 97; [37]. Another relevant dimension concerns the combination of public
and private services. The risk of rule breaking is increased through such hybridisation of
governmental body tasks. Administrators and public servants are expected to adhere to the
rules; however they must also act accordingly using business principles. This may create a
dilemma ([24, 29]; [37], pp. 32–35). Finally, one specific point of attention is the fact that
government bodies may simultaneously assume different roles. Some government
authorities draw up the rules, execute them and supervise the execution. In such a situation,
where a government body is responsible for the supervision of tasks carried out by the body
itself, there is an increased chance of ‘turning a blind eye’ to possible violations ( [19], p. 5).
Type of rules Rule breaking becomes easier if the scope of the rules is too extensive and if
the exact contents of the rules are ambiguous or unknown ([46]; [70], pp. 260–261). This
can, on occasion, result in rules which are in place to prevent rule breaking actually being
the cause of the act of rule breaking. Furthermore, specific adherence to legal regulations
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may be troublesome or expensive in certain cases. The opinion of the employees
concerning the rules is also an important aspect. If civil servants do not support the
contents of a specific rule, then there is a substantial probability that they will not adhere to
the rule or that they will alter the rule in accordance with their own preferences ([70],
pp. 262–264).
Organisation culture The ‘accepted’ level of discretion for rule breaking conduct is
strongly related to the culture present in an organisation [44]. The attitude of the managers
can be a determining factor in these situations. Organizations can and do create a moral
tone that powerfully influences the thinking, conduct, values and even the personalities of
the people working for them. This tone is set by the men who run the organization, and
their corruption can become the dominating influence throughout the organisation [22, 40].
If no strict measures are implemented against rule breaking conduct then a culture of illegal
practices will be created and this in turn forms the legitimisation for undermining authority
and misleading conduct [54, 56]. What is applicable to people is also applicable to
organisations, namely, one rule violation increases the chance of another violation. This in
turn will result in people becoming increasingly involved in an organisation where rule
breaking becomes the norm; this not only affects the organisational culture of those already
working in the organisation but also influences the behaviour of new employees.
Organisation structure There is a link between the set-up of the organisation, the type of
management within the organisation and the susceptibility concerning rule breaking.
Extensive de-centralisation or extensive concentrations of power are advantageous for rule
breaking situations. If managers are unaware of their employees’ tasks and conduct then it
is easier for employees to conceal their rule breaking conduct from their superiors.
However, the reverse situation, with a high power concentration may also be advantageous
for rule breaking. Whether rule breaking conduct actually occurs is mainly related to the
internal (and external) control systems in place: are there enough internal control
mechanisms present in order to prevent rule breaking conduct [14, 37, 54]?
Operating environment The prevailing environment within a public body is also an
influential factor for rule breaking conduct. Consider for example the party political battle;
the battle to win the favour of the voters is not always executed by legal means. The
interaction with customers who require services is also an important factor relating to the
environment. It is a known fact that the sectors of the organisation that have the most
contact with the outside world are the most susceptible to rule breaking conduct. These
sectors of the organisation are the most susceptible to collusion, but also corruption.
Consider, for instance, the possible financial temptations for those responsible for the
allocation of projects to private firms ([11, 27]; [53], pp. 24–26; [70], pp. 264–265).
External supervision structures The final category of influential factors for the extent to
which government bodies comply with their own rules relates to the external supervision
structures. This concerns, for example, the political-administrative and legal control
mechanisms. Is the government body being monitored by independent organisations? Is
there an effective public control in place? Close media supervision of the activities of a
government body creates a strong stimulus for that body to apply the official rules during
decision making processes. If the decisions of a government body are made public and
citizens are in the position to instigate legal proceedings against displeasing decisions, there
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is an additional incentive to focus on the official rules ([12], pp. 140–141; [13, 14, 26, 39];
[44], p. 463; [70]).
Preventative measures
Finally, a key question in this research project was: which methods, strategies or policies
are in place in order to curb rule and law breaking and how successful are they (or are they
considered to be)? It is possible that methods and instruments are already available within
the governmental organisations included in the study. These preventative measures may
function as good practices for other government bodies.
Summary
Table 1 contains a summary of the main concepts, which together form the structure of our
research.
Research data sets and research methods
The elements of our analytical model have been investigated in a large-scale research
project, which resulted in a number of data sets. The research included the collection and
analysis of statistics from the Dutch Public Prosecutions Department, information about
Table 1 Elements of the analytical framework
Concept of rule breaking Failure to implement, apply fairly or monitor laws and rules
Laws and rules that govern, or affect, the lives and activities of ordinary
citizens
Categories of rule breakers Government bodies
Administrators
Civil servants
Scale and nature of the
phenomenon
Frequency
Gravity
Pervasiveness
Omission or commission
Consciousness
Rationality
Involvement of superiors
Rule breaking circumstances Individual characteristics
Work situation
Type of tasks
Type of rules
Organisation culture
Organisation structure
Operating environment
External supervision structures
Preventative measures Methods and strategies
Good practices
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investigations by three National Inspectorates into rule breaking by private and public
actors, and case studies in two municipalities and one province into rule and law breaking.
The main themes and findings were then benchmarked against information from the United
Kingdom concerning rule breaking by government bodies.
Public Prosecutions Department
The first data set comprised all of the statistical material held by the Dutch Public
Prosecutions Department. The search system enabled the research group to gain an
understanding of the number of cases, the nature of the violated rule and how these cases
were dealt with for all Public Prosecutor offices. Answers to the following questions had to
be obtained: How many criminal acts does this concern? Which criminal acts occur? Who
reports these? Which acts result in prosecution? What are the penalties imposed
(settlements, convictions)? And is the conduct of the government bodies ‘better’ or ‘worse’
than private organisations operational in the same fields? Six interviews were held with
public prosecutors, policy officials and police officers. The interviewees were asked to
explain which deliberations play a role in the decision making process that may ultimately
result in criminal proceedings or convictions.
National inspectorates
The second set of data relates to an investigation of three selected Dutch national
inspectorates. Inspectorates have to ensure that private and public actors adhere to the rules.
What are their findings with respect to rule breaking by government bodies? The following
issues were covered in this subproject: How do the inspectorates operate and which
investigations do they carry out into adherence to rules? Which rule violations occur in the
field of policy-making and what is the extent of governmental involvement in these
violations? And what are the conditions and circumstances that play a role in governmental
rule breaking?
Information was obtained from the Inspectorate of Social Housing, Spatial Planning and
the Environment, the Inspectorate of Public Order and Safety and the Inspectorate of Youth
Aid and Youth Protection. A total of 16 interviews were held with employees from these
three inspectorates, at all levels throughout the organisations. In addition to this, the annual
reports from 2001 to 2002 were studied. Finally, within each inspectorate, two inspection
reports were analysed in consultation with the inspectorate management. Finally, two
inspection reports from each individual inspectorate were examined in consultation with
inspectorate management. The reports were chosen based on the expected value of the
report regarding collating additional information concerning the nature of the rule violations
in the policy fields in question.
It goes without saying that the information from the inspectorates and the public
prosecutions department is, to a certain extent, contingent to the willingness of these
enforcement agencies to report crimes and the focus of enforcement practices. This type of
information is usually distorted to a certain degree [5]. In this context, reference has to be
made to the probable existence of ‘dark numbers’ – the levels of unreported violations. It is
highly probable that the data provided by the enforcement agencies is an underestimation of
the actual number of rule violations. Furthermore, this data may not be a true representation
of the situation regarding the various types of violations committed by government bodies.
The attitude of the Dutch inspectorates, with respect to assessing the level of rule
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compliance in the public and private sector, is somewhat lethargic [8]. There are also not
many incentives to commence investigations, and the Public Prosecutions Department is
reluctant to prosecute in cases of governmental rule breaking, given the restricted criminal
liability of government bodies. These limitations of the data have to be kept in mind with
respect to making conclusions about the frequency of (various categories of) rule
violations.
Municipalities and province
The statistical material held by the Public Prosecutions Department and the information
from inspectorate investigations clearly illustrate which rule violations government bodies
actually become aware of. The Public Prosecutions Department and inspectorates’ data
primarily relates to the scale and the nature of the phenomenon. An additional investigation
was set-up in order to determine the context of the rule breaking; namely the conditions for
rule breaking and the possible preventive measures that have been developed through
experience. This was the main case study objective in the research into one small
municipality (about 25,000 inhabitants), one large municipality (more than 100,000
inhabitants) and one province. Full anonymity in future publications was given in order to
ensure co-operation from these Dutch local government bodies.
Various data collection methods were applied during the case study research into the
municipalities and the province. The information was partially derived from interviews.
Interviews were held with key figures around the onset of the research study in order to
obtain an initial general impression. Within each municipality and the province additional
interviews were held with managers, policy officials and executive staff members of one
single department in order to carry out an in-depth study into concrete cases of rule
breaking. A total of 31 people were interviewed during 14 interviews in the province. 17
interviews were held in the large municipality and a total of 23 people were interviewed. In
the small municipality a total of 17 people were interviewed during 15 interviews.
Document analysis was a second important research method. Reports concerning notices of
objection and appeal cases were studied. In addition to this, reports from legal audits,
integrity and management bills were also included in the investigation. Information was
also obtained from external investigations (e.g. investigations by the inspectorate of
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment). A third research method consisted of the
analysis of rule and law enforcement files of the enforcing department. These files pertained
to violations of the environmental legislation by other departments in the same municipality
or province. An investigation of this nature was only possible in the large municipality.
There were very few cases of this nature available in the smaller municipality and the
province. However, this does not mean that there are no rule or law violations within these
organisations. This was attributable to a low level of rule and law enforcement within the
organisation or due to the fact that the enforcing department tries to find solutions for rule
or law violations through communication with other sectors of the organisation.
Scope and nature of the phenomenon
The data obtained from the Public Prosecutions Department and several inspectorates
demonstrates that Dutch government organisations regularly violate administrative-law
regulations and – to a lesser extent – criminal law. All categories of government bodies are
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included in the group of rule breaking government bodies: municipalities, provinces and
also ministries. Violation of legislation occurs in obvious policy fields like ‘environment,’
but also in less obvious policy fields, for example ‘juvenile care.’ In short, this is a
phenomenon that is of importance to all policy sectors.
In the period 1999–2002 a total of 552 criminal investigations were instigated against
government bodies. The figures show a slow increase in the number of cases: 113 in 1999
and 163 in 2002. The vast majority of the violations relate to regulations in the field of
nature and environment (59.4%), followed by traffic (20.3%) and labour conditions
(11.8%).
The municipalities have the highest level of rule breaking within government bodies,
with 65.2% of the investigations (which is not surprising because their criminal liability is
more extensive than the liability of the national state bodies). Most cases are resolved
through a transaction; 53 cases, 13 per year, were brought before the courts. Almost all of
these resulted in a fine.
The data shows that if the total number of government bodies in the Netherlands is taken
into account, then the actual number regarding discovery, tracing and prosecution of
criminal rule breaking by government bodies is very low. It is thought that this is only the
tip of a larger iceberg (high dark number, representing minimum tracking down and limited
willingness to prosecute). This is plausible with respect to the number of cases. The cases
of criminal law violations by government organisations that are actually noted (and
prosecuted) suggest that the number of cases with significant immediate consequences is
very low. With respect to administrative law, government bodies commit quantitatively
more acts and these are of a more comprehensive nature. The attitude towards disregarding
procedural requirements is quite often permissive.
Government bodies are only capable of partially fulfilling their responsibilities in the
field of rule and law enforcement. There is still a rule and law enforcement deficiency
within government bodies. The governmental organisations have a tendency to fail to meet
the mark with respect to monitoring adherence to regulations by citizens and businesses and
also with respect to enforcing rules. Rule and law enforcement is less stringent if this
concerns their own organisation and/or other governmental organisation than if this
concerns a third party. The importance of rule enforcement towards government bodies is
sometimes disputed. Furthermore, there are additional obstacles for the rule enforcers, for
example their immediate relationships with the persons and organisations involved in the
compliance assessment.
Is a Dutch government body more or less likely to break rules than a private company?
Caution is essential when answering this question; given that no systematic comparative
research has been carried out. However, we do have some statistics and information about
inspectors’ investigations and experiences. Out of the 60.134 criminal procedures against
legal entities in the period 1999–2002, 552 (0.9%) were against government organisations.
The percentage relating to the Environmental Management Act, for example, was 1.4% and
the Soil Protection Act 3.3%. The governmental segment is therefore small. However, these
figures provide no information relating to the governmental and private inclination to break
rules, also because of the differences in criminal liability.
Investigations by inspectorates showed that public bodies are no more rule abiding than
private bodies. Municipalities scored just as well as private companies concerning hygiene
and safety issues in swimming pools. With respect to the Act on Noise Nuisance, the
government bodies had a low score, while industry was allocated a reasonable score. Also
on the basis of the estimates and opinions of the inspectors, we concluded that the theory
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that rule and law breaking conduct by government bodies occurs to a lesser extent, could
not be upheld; public bodies are not setting a good example.
The main conclusion is that Dutch government bodies break rules across the board: at all
geographical levels and in all policy sectors. However, it is not possible to indicate the
frequency of the rule breaking. The lion’s share of violations can be classified as conscious
and rational rule breaking. On occasion rule breaking conduct can be attributed to
unfamiliarity with the relevant law or rule. In the majority of cases the conduct is simply a
conscious choice to ignore a set of rules by making a rational deliberation that results in
non-adherence to the rule. In these cases it is possible that the mind is willing but the
resources do not permit this. Due to their insufficient capacity to perform to an optimum,
employees or administrators are then satisfied with a ‘good enough’ solution. However,
other interests normally prevail. These other interests are very often the interests of the
organisation. The violator is then sometimes convinced that his divergence from rule will
not cause too much damage to the ultimate aims of the legislator.
A section of the rule breaking can be qualified as acts of commission, another section as
acts of omission. The negligence of government organisations with respect to rule and law
enforcement constitutes a common example of the second type of violation. Central and
local government organisations are not properly equipped to control the observance of law
by citizens, private organisations and public bodies and the willingness to do so is also
lacking. The Dutch public sector and judicial literature refer to this low level of law and
rule enforcement as ‘rule enforcement deficiency’ [8]. Administrators and managers of
government organisations are fully aware of this situation. They have been attempting to
improve the quality of rule and law enforcement for the last few years.
Conditions for rule breaking
Which factors increase or reduce the likelihood that government bodies will violate rules? A
distinction has been made in our analytical framework between individual characteristics of
the rule breaker, work situation, type of tasks, type of rules, organisation culture, organisation
structure, operating environment and external supervision structures. The data obtained from
the case studies in the two municipalities and the province prove the relevance of these
categories of conditions to the occurrence of rule breaking in the Dutch situation.
Individual characteristics of the violator On occasion, civil servants or the government
bodies deem the rules as pointless, or at any rate irrelevant for their tasks and
responsibilities. Some rule breaking conduct is attributed to the opposition to the rule in
question by the employees. This disapproval of the contents of a rule is only partially
attributable to individual characteristics of an employee or administrator. The condemnation
of a rule is to a large extent a matter of organisation culture and/or an immediate
consequence of the type of rules.
The implication cannot be made that the fact that a civil servant or an administrator is
dissatisfied with the contents of a rule will result in non-adherence of the rule; however
there is no commitment or intent with respect to undertaking the implementation and
enforcement of the rule. For example, certain working conditions rules are deemed
excessive and the demands of multiple budgeting are considered unreasonable. The
participating province in this study provided a fine example of rules that were deemed
futile; this concerned the extension of the rules pertaining to waste matters. The province is
144 L.W.J.C. Huberts et al.
the competent authority in this field. If the legal definition of waste materials is literally
interpreted then potato peelings that are used to feed pigs are also waste materials. The
province would then be obliged to supervise and enforce the rules pertaining to the use of
potato peelings by agrarian businesses.
Work situation The capacity and knowledge of the staff concerning rules, policy and rule
enforcement is another relevant factor. Violations are often primarily attributable to a
shortage of sufficiently qualified personnel and/or a lack of specific knowledge of these
personnel. This type of violations fall under the header ‘where people work, mistakes will
be made,’ and concern also the more serious violations such as faulty application of
European rules. The two investigated municipalities and province are, just as all other
government organisations, subjected to a high level of working pressure and a limited
capacity. This is particularly applicable in the field of rule and law enforcement. Rule
breaking conduct is promoted if (national) rules are not in-line with the actual decentralised
execution. Assigning tasks to decentralised government organisations without prior checks
that sufficient means are available is another factor that stimulates violations.
Type of tasks In the Dutch situation, rule breaking conduct is not associated with a specific
category of tasks, with the sole exception being the frequent violations in the field of rule
and law enforcement. There is a so-called deficiency of enforcement in the public sector;
which is attributable to the aforementioned shortage of qualified staff.
Type of rules Some areas of rules are considered to be so complex or so general that they
actually give rise to doubts concerning the intention of the legislator; this is particularly so
for European Union rules. The European budget regulations were deemed complex in both
the investigated municipalities. However, a number of references were also made in this
context to the Administrative Law Act (the basic Dutch regulation in the field of
administrative law). The complicated relationship between administrative law and criminal
law is also conductive to rule breaking. Both sets of rules are in fact relatively interrelated
and the actual intention of these sets of rules has become less obvious, which makes it
difficult to decide which rule is suitable in a specific case.
Continually changing regulations is another factor that stimulates rule breaking conduct.
The Social Security Act, for example, given the high level of detail, was deemed
troublesome by municipal civil servants. This was exacerbated by the fact that social
security provisions are subject to frequent changes.
The third aspect of rules concerns the phenomenon of conflicting or contradictory rules.
Legislation of this nature is a cause of rule breaking conduct in the investigated
municipalities and province. In such cases adherence to one rule often implies breaking
another. However, in the case studies there were very few actual examples of rule breaking
brought about through contradictory rules.
Organisation culture Managers’ thoughts on rule breaking conduct vary significantly. The
provincial board assumes an active role in the prevention of rule breaking conduct. Some
provincial employees are of the opinion that the attitude of the province is excessive with
respect to risk taking. In their opinion an excessive emphasis on legitimate operations will
be detrimental to the province’s firm actions in the future. In the case studies there were
also numerous statements concerning the attitude of government bodies following the
disasters in the cities of Enschede and Volendam, namely that government bodies have
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become fearful and excessively cautious. Despite this more cautious and preventative
culture with respect to rule breaking, administrators and employees still continue their
intentional search for the boundaries of legislation on occasion.
Organisation structure Furthermore, the administrative organisation (procedures) is an
important tool for adequate application of rules. Insufficient documentation of procedures is
an important cause of rule breaking conduct in all three investigated organisations. This is
more prominent in the smaller municipality. There is a lack of defined administrative
procedures in this municipality, primarily with respect to numerous legal tasks such as
granting subsidies, permits and enforcing rules.
The set-up of the government organisation is also relevant. The compartmentalisation of
the civil service organisation is a contributory factor with respect to an insufficient level of
adherence to rules, for the larger municipality in particular. The various municipal
departments show insufficient levels of co-operation which in turn results in the failure to
give all of the relevant frameworks the attention they require. For example, environmental
aspects are not always fully taken into consideration when municipal buildings are being
constructed.
Operating environment On occasion, civil servants are under the impression that
administrators attempt to coerce them to act in a manner they deem improper. There have
also been incidents of administrators directly influencing procedures such as granting
permits and subsidies. In the larger municipality matters are quite easily labelled as
‘political’ and processed accordingly. Although political interest deliberations do not
generally result in direct rule breaking, a number of the interviewees experienced this
politisation as problematic. Consider, for example, speeding up permit processes for the
benefit of a large company. Influencing decision-making politically is primarily thought to
be problematic when this occurs in the field of rule and law enforcement.
The open system in the small municipality leads to closeness between the board and the
civil service, which also means that the board can be more readily approached. In general
this is thought to be positive, however, there is also a downside; certain interviewees are of
the opinion that the relationship between the board and the management team should be of
a more professional nature. These people consider the current situation too much of a
throwback to the old boys network.
Thus the level of affiliation between the public body and its environment determines the
probability of selective treatment and favouritism. The ‘gap’ between society and the
government is also a relevant aspect: closeness creates danger. Governmental activities that
involve high levels of contact with the outside world are vulnerable. The investigated
municipalities and province are fully aware of this. There is the risk that those granting
permits and those enforcing permits may all too readily identify themselves with the
organisations or the persons they are involved with, which may result in the toleration of rule
breaking. Furthermore, this situation creates situations in which people can use their own
personal contacts on the board to achieve results others cannot. Finally, ‘who you are’ does
make a difference, e.g. the application of a random member of the public or the neighbour of
a board member. There are some incidents that can be considered as favouritism.
External supervision structures There is a limited chance of detection and being sanctioned
for rule breaking conduct by a supervisor or a rule enforcer. This makes rule breaking
relatively risk-free. The absence of effective external control systems increases violations.
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Conclusion The research has shown that the nature of the individual and the work are less
relevant (the opinions of the people concerned regarding the value or futility of the rule is
however an important exception here). The nature of the rules and how they are executed,
the quality of the organisation that must operate in accordance with the rules (knowledge,
capacity), the characteristics of the supervision structures (sanctions), the political
‘environment’ and the affiliation and the forcefulness of the bond with society are
important factors. All in all, it can be concluded that rule breaking by government bodies
does not primarily relate to the individual that breaks the rule. This conduct is in fact an
inherent part of the organisation and its environment. Government bodies should take this
into consideration. Removing the individual violator, the rotten apple, does not resolve the
structural issues.
Preventative measures by government bodies
The measures taken by government bodies to prevent rule breaking conduct is an important
research question. Four categories of preventative measures were established in the Dutch
situation: juridical monitoring, integrity policy, rule and law enforcement policy and the
establishment of specialised watch dog-organisations.
Juridical monitoring Special provisions have been made in a large number of public sector
organisations in the Netherlands, in order to improve the juridical quality of their activities
and decisions. This often means that one or more employees have been allocated the
specific task of monitoring the juridical quality of the organisations’ operation. These
employees are responsible for conducting legal audits and implementing the required
measures in order to maintain and improve the juridical quality of various organisational
aspects [55].
However, it is still early days with respect to the development of juridical monitoring
systems within the investigated municipalities and province. For example, the large
municipality has recently invested in juridical monitoring. Juridical monitors and juridical
employees have been appointed throughout the entire organisation, i.e. in the centre of the
organisation and also in the various divisions. Periodical discussions are held in a legal
platform. A juridical controller evaluates the decision-making documents presented to the
board. The private-law agreements relating to the municipality are screened. Furthermore,
checks are carried out pertaining to regulations and by-laws and a legal audit is also carried
out in each sector.
Integrity policy Although both municipalities and the province have drawn up integrity
policies, there are clear differences concerning the intrinsic nature of these policies. The
small municipality has the most active integrity policy out of the three. This municipality has
held a number of integrity workshops and the matter is discussed on a more regular basis.
Internal integrity regulations are also in place concerning standards for desirable conduct:
disciplinary measures may be implemented for violations of these integrity standards.
Rule and law enforcement policy With respect to this third category of preventative
measures it can be established that the disasters in the cities of Enschede (May 2000) and
Volendam (January 2001) were a wake-up call for government bodies in the Netherlands,
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and consequently also for both municipalities and the province. This entails that the
required measures were implemented in all three organisations in order to increase the level
of rule and law enforcement. The flip side however is also cause for concern. Government
bodies should not adopt an apprehensive and cautious approach, i.e. an approach which
exhibits their lack of courage to function effectively due to the incidents. Some interviewees
are of the opinion that this is applicable to the province. It is also considered problematic on
occasion in both municipalities.
The policy of ‘governmental tolerance to rule breaking’ (i.e. the policy of deliberate non-
enforcement of rules and laws in certain situations) forms an inherent part of rule and law
enforcement policy. This was supported by all three investigated government bodies. One
of the interviewees in the province stated: ‘it is not possible to do everything that is required
by law.’ The province drew up policy rules (entitled ‘Limits to Tolerance’) in 2001 in order
to ensure that the ‘governmental tolerance to rule breaking’ is operated effectively. There
are also similar tolerance guidelines in place in the larger municipality.
Watch dog-organisations A patchwork of regulatory and supervising agencies has been set-
up in the Netherlands, the purpose of which is to stimulate governmental bodies to
approach members of the public and companies in a legitimate and proper fashion.
Consider, for example, the very recent introduction of a system in which the citizens of
each and every municipality have the opportunity to submit a grievance to the National
ombudsman (or a local ombudsman) regarding the conduct of public bodies, public
servants and administrators. We refer also to the very recent formation of a national
integrity agency that can be approached by municipalities or other government
organisations with the request to investigate the integrity of specific bodies or persons
and/or to lend a helping hand with developing an integrity policy. The tasks and
responsibilities of the national integrity agency are very similar to those of the local agency
of the city of Amsterdam, which was established a few years earlier, in 2001.
Benchmarking against the UK
In order to validate our research, it was important that verification be obtained that the
situation in the Netherlands was not unique in terms of the issues, themes and findings.
Therefore, in order to determine to which extent the types and causes of rule breaking are
specific to the Dutch context and the degree of similarity with the UK situation the main
categories of motives and conditions were benchmarked against examples of rule breaking
by governmental bodies in the United Kingdom. The UK research involved desk research
into evidence of rule breaking at national and local levels, and also within a range of public
sector bodies. It also involved a review of the main themes of change to the public sector,
especially the impact of the New Public Management reforms.
Scale and nature As is the case with the Dutch research, there is little direct information on
routine or ‘ordinary’ rule breaking. Some examples of more general information include the
Audit Commission (the external auditor for local government and the health service) which
has analysed its Public Interest Reports (PIRs). PIRs are issued by a District Auditor and
relate to conduct that is considered potentially illegal or in breach of formal procedures. 16
were issued between June and September 2005, the first time the reports have been
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published on the Commission’s website. The rule breaking conduct ranged from achieving
personal benefit to sub-rational and subconscious rule breaking, including a failure ‘to
follow the established rules and procedures for capital schemes and to ensure that they had
budget approval for work before tenders were invited’ and failure ‘to meet specific statutory
financial duties and targets.’ A motive analysis has been carried out on these reports; these
ranged from obsession with performance targets, over-dominant senior managers,
negligence, absence of professional competence, etc [3].
At a lower level, the figures for the Local Ombudsman Service for England provides an
indication of the areas in which the public are of the opinion that rules or procedures have
not been upheld or they have complaints of injustice arising from maladministration by
local authorities and certain other bodies. There are three Local Government Ombudsmen
in England, each dealing with grievances from different parts of the country. They
investigate complaints about the majority of council matters including housing, planning,
education, social services, consumer protection, drainage and council tax. Only 120 out of
the 20,000 or more grievances concerned maladministration causing ‘injustice.’ The UK
also has a body with the statutory responsibility to enforce a Code of Conduct for local
government councilors which is intended to separate their personal and financial interests
from their public duties; this body received nearly 4,000 complaints in 2004–2005 and in
9% of cases established there was evidence to present to an adjudication tribunal. There is
also data from the Health and Safety field. The Health and Safety Commission, and its
operational arm, the Health and Safety Executive [HSE], have, since 1974, been responsible
for providing guidance and policing all aspects of health and safety across public and
private sectors. They have 4,000 employees and issue codes of practice. They have an
Inspectorate with right of entry and the power to issue improvement and prohibition
notices. They have the authority to prosecute in criminal courts and may act against
individuals or organisations in both public and private sectors. 50 local councils have been
taken to court and fined for breaches of health and safety requirements during the last
5 years; some of these involve rule breaking.
The information obtained from these inspectorates and other monitoring and inspecting
bodies clearly showed that there is evidence of routine rule breaking on a regular basis;
however, as was the case in The Netherlands, it was not possible to determine the frequency
of this conduct. Nor is it currently possible to determine any positive or negative trends for
this conduct.
New public management Many of the audit and inspection bodies publish case studies
which suggest that the types of rule breaking, the causes for rule breaking and the
conditions for rule breaking do parallel those in the Netherlands. In the UK context,
however, New Public Management (NPM) has also had a huge impact through the
introduction of a management culture together with its own motivating components such as
performance incentives, judgement by results and customer service. NPM has generated a
flood of private sector procedures and practices with the maximum possible delegation of
authority, budgets and resources to deliver public services.
The focus on public management in the public sector through ‘budget cuts, competition,
performance measurement and the imposition of management systems on previously
autonomous institutions and professions’ ( [23], p. 107) with ‘received notions of high
quality management derived from transferable good practice in the private sector’ ([20], p. 14)
has had a downside. The culture shift from caution and risk – avoidance to risk-taking, from
the anonymous application of rules to individual, responsive and dynamic management
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control has created cultures in which there was ‘misunderstanding among public servants
about the quasi-private sector environment...(and)... inaccurate perceptions of private sector
values and practices’ ( [31], pp. 4–5). Not only was the public sector subject to the speed,
purpose and complexity of the changes by organisations and within organisations, but the
changes threw up a number of issues concerning the attitudes and practices of a private sector
approach, and the sometimes conflicting objectives of delivery, cost-cutting and performance
by results against those of due process, procedure and precedent. In short, the changes
brought into sharp focus the potential for the conditions (and justifications) for rule breaking.
Individual characteristics The publications of the National Audit Office and those of the
parliamentary body to which it reports (the Committee of Public Accounts) regularly
describe the misuse of discretionary powers, bypassing restrictive public sector rules in
semi-autonomous agencies with strong senior executives or Chairs of Boards, with a
preference for private sector styles of management, including the following example of a
local development agency handling millions of pounds for urban regeneration: “as
Accounting Officer for the Corporation, the former Chief Executive had personal
responsibility for the propriety and regularity of the public monies under his control, for
ensuring that the Corporation met the requirements of Government Accounting, that
resources provided by Parliament were used economically, efficiently and effectively, and
were accounted for properly. The Corporation, however, did not always follow Government
Accounting, and other Departmental and Treasury guidance. For example, the Chief
Executive disposed of land through negotiated sale rather than through open competition,
did not seek Departmental approval before committing to projects outside the Corporation’s
delegated authority, or the Department’s advice on novel and contentious proposals. The
Corporation relied on its own legal advice on whether the Corporation had the power to
enter into ‘forward funding arrangements’ with developers without consulting fully with the
Department. There was insufficient separation of responsibilities. For example, the Chief
Executive often took the lead in disposal negotiations, and then recommended acceptance
of the transactions to the Board. He also acted outside his delegated authority in the week
prior to the wind-up of the Corporation, by granting a mortgage to the purchaser of a site,
which Corporations were prohibited from doing” ( [9], par. 14).
Work situation The importance of the ‘negative’ work situation can be illustrated by the
following case of a Labour council in the 1980s and 1990s. Lambeth council had been
poorly managed for years. The external audit agency for local government published 45
reports (from 1979 to 1993) that drew attention to its deteriorating financial position (1980),
its collapse in income from housing rents (1979), its lack of accounting systems and
financial control (1980), and failure to know its financial position (1985). When the council
were required by law to implement the rules and procedures for privatisation and the
introduction of internal markets within the organisation they proved so complex for the
council, which was also intent to obstruct the implementation of central government policy,
that it resulted in chaos. The council departments were independent of and jealous of each
other, council meetings were unruly and unproductive, staff was unqualified, inexperienced,
and often totally non-suitable for the position they had been given. There were signs of
nepotism; the majority of management is either incompetent or incapable, contributing to a
disorganised and chaotic administration, an ‘appalling’ management and ‘the perfect
atmosphere for abuse’ [16] in which rule breaking occurs across a range of activities from
contract allocation to appointments.
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Type of tasks There are a number of examples at local and national levels where using
shortcuts and bending the rules was apparently needed in order to deliver projects and
performance. Therefore, the Audit Commission published a report in 2005 [3] about a local
government council, whose haste to implement a new senior management structure and
relocate staff and a corporate call centre to a newly renovated building brought about a
series of failures by senior officials:
– To comply with the constitutional requirement that all capital proposals undergo a
formal project appraisal, even though members submitted a specific request to do so;
– To adhere to the established rules and procedures for capital schemes and to ensure that
budget approval had been received before inviting for tenders;
– To comply with the Council’s tendering procedures and European legislative require-
ments for the facilities management contract;
– To comply with the Council’s arrangements for authorising expenditure and the
payment of invoices; and
– To consult colleagues on draft reports, where appropriate, and to seek the advice of the
Council’s statutory officers when required.
In 2001, the National Audit Office, the state auditor responsible for national government
departments, reported that a number of hospitals had ‘inappropriately adjusted their waiting
lists, three of them for some 3 years or more, affecting nearly 6,000 patient records. For the
patients concerned this constituted a major breach of public trust and was inconsistent with
the proper conduct of public business ... The adjustments varied significantly in their
seriousness, ranging from those made by junior staff following established, but incorrect,
procedures through to what appears to be deliberate manipulation or misstatement of the
figures’ ( [52], p. 1) A possible delay for patients is not the sole outcome of amending
waiting list figures, the hospital rankings in the performance tables were also affected,
which in turn had implications for funding and the status of senior managers.
Organisation culture The NPM process led to the development of other private practices
and expectations in a new public management context that may have led to a conflict
between private sector values and the enterprise culture, and the roles, responsibilities and
standards of the public sector [18]. For example, this attitude was apparently present in the
NHS because managers perceived “a tension between following proper procedures and
‘getting things done.’ Indeed, the whole ethos of the NHS following the introduction of
general management in the 1980s was one many interpreted as ‘business-oriented,’ ‘risk-
taking’ and ‘go-getting.’ Such attitudes...were a deliberate move away from the image of
the traditional, safe, risk-averse ‘administrator’ concerned with correct procedures and
protocols” ( [2], p. 52).
Critical reports by the NAO during the late 1980s and early 1990s into the activities of
Regional Health Authorities reflected a belief that the ‘new climate in the NHS at the time
justified adopting an approach in which the highest priority was to ensure that problems
were solved, even if the rules were bent or broken in the process’ or that actions were
‘within the entrepreneurial culture which appeared to be sanctioned by senior NHS
management at the time.’ This was also supported by a 1993 survey of NHS Trust boards
(the boards responsible for individual hospitals) which suggested that attitudes to probity
were not uniform and that ‘a substantial minority’ of members would condone otherwise
unacceptable behaviour in certain circumstances (including those relating to contract
information and following Standing Orders). In findings that the survey regarded as ‘highly
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statistically significant,’ those with the most permissive attitudes were those who were
executive directors, many of whom had ‘gained the majority of their previous work
experience within the NHS’ ( [73], p. 29).
Organisation structure In its analysis of what may predispose organisations to rule
breaking the Audit Commission noted: poor working relationships; low levels of internal
accountability; a ‘closed’ culture that does not accept external challenge and scrutiny; poor
strategic risk management; lack of clarity about objectives, roles and responsibilities; poor
information for decision makers; and poor leadership ([4], p. 6).
Thus between 1997 and 2004, Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council was
investigated over allegations of misusing councilor and officers’ expenses, allowances
and benefits; rigging tendering procedures (including the identification of instances where
contracts had been awarded without the tendering process having taken place), and
favouring private partnerships with local companies. The rule breaking was well-known
inside the Council but ignored by councilors and senior officials. The external auditor
continued to express his concern, with no response, until he issued a formal public report
and sent it to the police (leading to the arrest of 40 councilors, 27 of whom were later
charged with offences). Nationally, the early 1990s saw a number of cases [15] involving
financial waste, misappropriation, covert attempts at privatisation, controversial manage-
ment buy-outs, conflict-of-interest, fraud and corruption across the public sector
organisations, from mainstream departments, through to public bodies and local councils
to voluntary and private sector organisations spending public money.
Elsewhere there are examples of the failure of senior managers not being aware of the
activities of their employees (for example a leading Inland Revenue senior special investigator
took bribes in a culture where ‘too much trust was placed on individuals and systems without
proper audit checks or reviews’ ( [51], p. 23) to senior managers having too much influence
over the activities of their body (for example, the NAO reported that the Sports Council’s
arrangements to strengthen ‘their commercial activities have weakened accountability for and
control over publicly funded assets and services’ ( [50], p. 5).
Operating environment An important condition for rule breaking concerns political
pressure over-riding administrative procedures. This may manifest through administrative
decisions taken with a political rather than a public service intention. In local government,
where councils were encouraged during the 1980s and 1990s to sell off social housing to
tenants, one council (Westminster Council in inner London) used its Conservative majority
to control the sales to be targeted on areas of marginal Conservative support and based on
an assumption that home-owners were likely to be more predisposed to the council and
more conservative in their voting habits. As a policy, it was successful in that it secured a
clear majority in the 1990 elections but adjudged by the external audit agency for local
government to be partisan, that political motives over-rode financial stewardship and that
the council had lost up to £27 million as a consequence.
The managerial and performance environment – where the emphasis is on ‘results’ –
may also persuade officials to over-ride rules in pursuit of managerialism and cost savings.
Therefore, a council was fined in 2000 for continued use of rear-steps on waste collection
vehicles; the court took account of aggravating factors of flouting legislation when the
council failed to heed warnings, were aware of the standards they were supposed to follow,
and knew the risks involved but did not accept that safety had been compromised for
commercial gain. In the case of Barrow in Furness council referred in the foregoing, both a
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council architect and the council were found guilty of failing to take reasonable care under
the Health and Safety at Work Act when several people died and a much greater number
fell ill as a result of legionnaire’s disease contracted from a faulty air-conditioning system in
a public leisure centre. It is said that the council saved around £3,000 by not properly
maintaining the air conditioning unit while the council employee allegedly decided to
cancel a maintenance contract for the air conditioning system, but failed to include
measures to clean the water in the rooftop cooling towers in the system. A charge of
manslaughter was thrown out as the actions were not seen as deliberate but as a
consequence of a mix of a practical solution (saving money) and carelessness (not being
aware of the consequences).
External supervision structure Interestingly, when a ‘soft touch’ approach to accountability
is used, the reactions of organisations to allegations of rule breaking are not only hostile, the
organisation even deem it intrusive; in other words, such organisations often respond badly
to criticism. The relevant rule breaking factor here is that the conduct, which would be
criticised at a later time by public auditors, was proposed and officially promoted by the
organisations concerned. The Ministry of Defence, criticised for a performance bonus
scheme, argued that the interpretation of what, in relation to the efficiency scheme,
constituted acceptable expenditure as well as what expenditure would require prior
approval, differed because of ‘the very different perceptions of life from MOD
Headquarters and elsewhere.’ The regional development agency considering privatisation
believed that ‘an increasing percentage of its activities are funded from self-generated
funds...The management style of the Agency is, and needs to be, very much concerned with
the use of private sector techniques and disciplines’.. Indeed, in a number of regional health
agencies the majority of the senior managers’ attitude towards criticism was based on a
belief that the Conservative government had created an ‘entrepreneurial culture which
appeared to be sanctioned by senior NHS management at the time’ and which, in turn,
‘justified adopting an approach in which the highest priority was to ensure that problems
were solved, even if the rules were bent or broken in the process’ [15].
Preventative measures The growth in the numbers of auditors, inspectors and regulators is
a consequence of the concerns about integrity, governance and discretionary responsibility.
It has been argued that the UK “faces scrutiny by a growing army of waste-watchers,
quality checkers, ‘sleaze busters’ and other regulators. Some of these oversight
organisations are common to the public and private sectors (for instance data protection
and safety at work regulators). But many are specific to public bodies, including systems of
audit, grievance chasing, standard setting, inspection and evaluation....” ( [33], p. 61).
Ironically, and as noted in the Dutch context, too much regulation can itself become a
source of routine rule breaking. The Committee on Standards in Public Life has decided to
examine [10] the implementation and impact of their previous work: ‘the implementation of
recommendations in many of the Committee’s reports has required the establishment of a
number of procedures. If the burden of these procedures becomes disproportionate or ill-
adapted to the outcomes desired, it is unlikely that standards of propriety will be
maintained. In such circumstances, the work of those seeking to maintain public standards
could be undermined not only by over-bureaucratic or over-zealous procedures, but also by
a degree of public cynicism.’ In other words, there is the worry that too many rules and
procedures regarding rule breaking may have a similar impact as the reasons for rule
breaking – such as presence of complex, rapidly changing; sometimes contradictory rules,
Law breaking by government in the Netherlands and United Kingdom 153
lack of support for the rules or the interpretation; insufficient supervision and sanctions –
and bring them into disrepute if the public think they are not working or are being ignored.
Conclusion As with the evidence from the Netherlands, the above examples, and other
cases analysed by the UK researchers supported the contention that the main motives for
rule breaking involve a conscious choice to ignore rules that are too complex, irrelevant or
ignored due to lack of resources or organisational capacity. This is due to political pressure
in a small number of cases; however the impact of NPM was much more likely to be the
cause of rule breaking. The conditions for rule breaking have been augmented through the
impact of NPM reforms, by the discretion given to many bodies, and by the regulatory and
other demands placed on organisations. Together, the UK examples confirm the contention
that rule breaking by government bodies does not primarily relate to the individual that
breaks the rule but is in fact an inherent part of the organisation and its operating
environment. In 1995 a national Committee on Standards in Public Life was set up to
promote standards in public service.
Conclusions and recommendations
Answers to our central research question were provided in the previous sections: To what
extent and in which manner do government bodies break rules, what are the underlying
reasons for doing so, which circumstances are conductive or unfavourable for rule breaking
conduct and which measures are implemented by government bodies in order to prevent
rule breaking? With respect to the scope and character of the phenomenon the main
conclusion is that all categories of government bodies break rules, both in the Netherlands
and the UK. Rule breaking is also not restricted to certain policy sectors. However, it is not
possible to indicate the frequency of rule violations.
A number of conditions have turned out to be conductive to rule breaking by
government bodies. One of them relates to the gaps that may exist between different
governmental levels. In both the Netherlands and the UK it has been observed that, at local
or regional level, government bodies are not always in agreement with national or
international rules, or are faced with deciding between conflicting rules, or have to be
selective when faced with too many rules, and therefore break these rules by omission or
otherwise. Another condition concerns the level of supervision of rule compliance and the
likelihood of being punished after rule violations. In both countries there is a limited chance
of detection and being sanctioned for rule breaking conduct by a supervisor or a rule
enforcer. This makes rule breaking a quite safe undertaking. A third relevant condition
pertains to the political influence on the execution of tasks by civil servants. Civil servants
sometimes feel pressed by administrators to act in a manner that they consider improper.
This brings us to a fourth condition: the culture of government bodies.
The changing UK public sector environment has shown that an entrepreneurial culture,
in which the application of private sector approaches is being encouraged in the public
sector, can lead to rule breaking. An entrepreneurial culture may result in an approach in
which problem solving or achieving performance targets is thought to be more important
than compliance with rules.
One final condition that can be stated here regards the level of unification with society.
Governmental activities that involve high levels of contact with the outside world are
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susceptible to rule violations as a result of selective treatment and favouritism. Closeness
creates danger.
All in all, it has become clear that rule breaking by government bodies does not
primarily relate to the individual that breaks the rule. The motives and the conduct of rule
breakers are interwoven in the environment within and outside the government body. This
means it is not possible to remedy rule breaking conduct by removing the individual
violator, the rotten apple. Structural solutions are necessary.
Some essential structural solutions have already been realised by Dutch and British
government bodies. Four categories of preventative measures were dealt with in this study:
juridical monitoring, integrity policy, rule and law enforcement policy and the introduction
of a number of watch dog-organisations. These preventative measures, in combination with
our analysis of the conditions and motives for rule breaking conduct, offer useful starting
points for the formulation of a number of recommendations. The following series of
recommendations are given, which may be of use for government bodies.
Our first recommendation pertains to the low level of awareness within governments and
government bodies relating to the problematic nature of routine rule breaking government
bodies. Increasing the level of understanding and awareness among civil servants and
administrators is an issue that requires attention. This primarily concerns the awareness –
incorporated in and activated by an integrity policy – that rule breaking actually occurs, that
various rules are being broken and that employees and politicians have to be alert for such
matters.
Secondly, we recommend that sufficient focus is given to the scope and the nature of the
established rule violations. Conscious rule breaking as a result of improper or unilateral
interests does occur. However, this type of severe rule breaking seems to be an exception.
Rule breaking more often relates to legitimate deliberations of rules and/or costs by civil
servants and administrators. A lack of knowledge or a lack of proper expertise also plays a
significant role in this issue. Any measures to be implemented should focus on matters of
this nature: providing more information and knowledge, working to improve awareness,
improving the quality of the organisation and coupling these measures to initiatives and
policies concerning rule and law enforcement.
In this respect, the fact that an increasing number of government organisations, in
particular at the local level, are switching to a programmatic rule and law enforcement
policy is relevant. Governmental rule breaking should be allocated a position within
programmatic rule and law enforcement. Municipalities with a programmatic rule and law
enforcement policy should in fact focus on the adherence to rules within their own
departments and service providers and by other public actors in the municipal territory.
These are prerequisites for an integral risk inventory and an integral rule and law
enforcement strategy. Within the rule and law enforcement policy sufficient priority should
be given to rule breaking government bodies.
Fourthly and finally, we recommend that administrative bodies proactively and
systematically accept responsibility for addressing rule breaking. The problem of rule
breaking government bodies should be taken seriously, with focus placed on improved
registration, greater awareness, organisational improvements and the link with legislation
policy and rule and law enforcement strategy. The rule and law enforcement strategy must
stipulate that with respect to all legislation and rules, government bodies should also adhere
to this. It must also be made clear which exceptions to this principle are acceptable. This
does not primarily relate to technical deliberations and executive responsibilities. Just as is
the case when drawing up legislation and rules, the adherence and enforcement thereof
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relate to political-administrative choices. The politically responsible administrators should
take the lead. In this article we have handed government bodies some theoretical and
practical building blocks to take up this challenge.
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